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Malaysia is notable among developing countries for its long-standing commitment to 
maintaining a relatively open trade policy regime. It never relied heavily on 
quantitative restrictions (QRs) and other forms of non-tariff protection; and its tariffs 
on both domestic manufacturing and agriculture were low relative to other developing 
countries. In the first half of the 1980s — as part of a state-led heavy industrialization 
strategy — and in the immediate aftermath of the 1997-98 economic crisis, tariffs on 
some manufactured goods were substantially increased and some were brought under 
QRs to support some domestic industries in face of a massive domestic economic 
contraction. However, these measures were reversed and further tariff cuts were 
undertaken in the ensuing years.   
Unlike its counterpart in other countries, the Malaysian government 
persistently eschewed direct procurement of agricultural output through government 
marketing boards or direct influence of export prices. Export duties on the two major 
primary commodities, rubber and palmoil, were a major source of government 
revenue until the mid-1980s. However, export taxes were periodically adjusted in line 
with world price trends in order to keep the producer prices by and large stable over 
time. The government also ploughed back a significant share of this revenue into 
well-designed and efficiently implemented replanting schemes and productivity 
enhancing research in these industries. Over the past two decades export duties on 
rubber and palmoil have decreased drastically, but these traditional export industries 
have been under persistent domestic cost pressure arising from rapid structural 
transformation of the economy through successful global integration.      
Production of paddy rice⎯the staple food of the country and the principal 
domestic food crop⎯stands out as the single most assisted economic activity in the 
country.  In the immediate post-war years, assistance to this crop was introduced by   2
the colonial government on grounds of food-security. After independence, and 
particularly since embarking on the New Economic Policy (a sweeping affirmative 
action policy package) in 1970, rice has become an increasingly sensitive ‘political 
crop’. While achieving food self sufficiency has continued to be a ‘moving target’ in 
the successive development plans, protecting rice farmers (who are predominantly 
concentrated in relatively economically backward states) remains by far the dominant 
reason behind continuing protection. Producers of subsidiary crops, horticultural 
products, livestock and fishing have been operating under a virtually free trade regime 
throughout with the exception of quantitative restrictions on the importation of round 
cabbages. High-value (processed) food products have emerged as an important 
dynamic export product over the past two decades. 
The main purposes of this chapter are to provide an analytical narrative of the 
nature and evolution of trade in Malaysia and the related accompanying policies 
impacting on domestic agriculture, with a focus on the underlying political economy, 
and to examine the degree and changing patterns of policy distortions to incentives in 
domestic agriculture encompassing both direct (sector-specific) incentives and 
indirect incentives emanating from economy-wide policies. We also aim to inform 
contemporary Malaysian debate on the future direction of national development 
policy as it relates to domestic agriculture. The analysis is undertaken against the 
backdrop of the on-going process of rapid structural transformation of the Malaysian 
economy over the past three decades. As an integral part of the analysis, an attempt is 
made to delineate the implications, over and above that of the policy-induced 
incentives, of the process of structural transformation for the long-term viability of 
traditional plantation crops and new opportunities for agricultural output expansion in 
the subsidiary food crop sector.  
The study covers the period from 1960 (the earliest year of reliable data after 
independence in 1957) to 2004 with emphasis on four major products: rubber, 
palmoil, cocoa, and rice. The first three are exportable products while the fourth, the 
main staple product of the country, is an import-competing product. The four products 
together accounted for between three-fifths and four-fifths of the value of total 
agricultural GDP over the period examined. Paucity of data does not permit further 
commodity coverage, but virtually all other agricultural products have been facing 
free trade conditions throughout the period under study.    3
The structure of the chapter is as follows: the next section provides an 
overview of growth and structural change in the Malaysian economy during the post-
independence era (since 1957), with emphasis on the relative importance of the 
agricultural sector in the economy and trends and compositional shifts in agricultural 
output and trade. This is followed by a survey of the evolution of agricultural trade 
policy during the post-independence era (since 1957) against the backdrop of the 
overall national development strategy and macroeconomic policy. Particular attention 
is given to political-economy considerations underpinning policy directions. The next 
section provides estimates on the extent and patterns of direct and indirect distortions 
to incentives faced by domestic agriculture using the indicators specifically 
constructed for this study. The final section contains a summary of the key findings 
and policy inferences.  
 
 
Agriculture in the Malaysian economy 
 
 
To understand the policy environment it is instructive to first explain the country’s 
economic growth trends and then its patterns of structural change both inter-sectorally 
and within the agricultural sector.  
 
Economic growth trends 
 
At the time of independence in 1957, Malaysian was a classic example of an export 
economy (Levin 1960): an economy in which the modern sector — concentrated in 
primary production for export — dominated the entire organization of production. 
Natural rubber directly accounted for 25 percent of GDP while the second largest 
export, tin, accounted for 5 percent (Meernam 1979). In addition, a host of activities 
in the services sector — embracing trade, transport and finance — were dependent on 
the export sector. Production patterns exhibited only limited changes until about the 
mid-1970s. Structural changes since then have been dramatic, however. In particular, 
beginning in the late 1980s there has been an expansion of export-oriented 
manufacturing and related modern sector activities. The share of agriculture in GDP   4
declined to 19 percent by the late 1980s and then plummeted to 8.5 percent in 2005 
(Table 1 and Appendix Figure A1).   
In the early 1970s agriculture directly absorbed over half of the total labor 
employed in the country. This share declined to 13.7 percent by 2005. The contraction 
in the relative importance of agriculture in total labor absorption was particularly 
marked over the past two decades (Table1 and Appendix Figure A1). Despite this 
dramatic structural transition, promoting employment opportunities in the rural 
economy (roughly equivalent to the agricultural sector) has continued to be an 
important focus of the successive 10-year development plans of the country. This is 
particularly due to the related delicate ethnic dimension: over 90 percent of the 
agricultural labor force belongs to the Malay community. The incidence of poverty in 
the rural economy is still high (11 percent in 2003) compared to 2.2 percent in the 
urban sector and a national average of 6 percent.(Government of Malaysia 2006a). 
Over the past three decades or so, the agricultural sector has been under 
consistent pressure from the ‘resource pull’ effects of rapid structural change in the 
economy (Athukorala and Manning 1999, Barlow and Jayasuriya 1987). Widening 
urban-rural wage differentials and an aversion of younger people to engage in 
agricultural pursuits increased rural-to-urban labor migration. This caused widespread 
labor shortages in the rural economy and put increased pressure on agricultural wages. 
The area under traditional plantation crops shrunk in semi-urban areas because of the 
dispersion of industrial centres across the peninsula and the resultant increased 
demand for land for residential and industrial expansion. In the face of severe 
shortages of local labor, agricultural producers — firstly plantation companies, and 
more recently small-holder producers of cash crop and paddy — began to rely 
increasingly on foreign workers. The estimated foreign labor force in Malaysia 
increased from around half a million in the mid-1980s to 1.8 million (23 percent of 
the total labor force) by 2003, and around half of these workers were in the 
agricultural sector (Athukorala 2006a). The dependence on foreign labor is 
particularly high in the rubber industry, given the relatively high labor intensity of 
both cultivation and harvesting. However, the relatively more capital intensive 
palmoil industry also began to depend increasingly on foreign workers because fresh 
fruit bunch harvesting is conducted manually. According to a recent survey — the 
Malayan Agricultural Producers Association survey — 37 percent of the total labor   5
force in private sector plantations in Peninsular Malaysia are foreign workers and the 
percentage is as high as 80 percent in East Malaysia (Khoo and Chandramohan 2002).  
 
Structural changes: plantation (cash) crops  
 
Rubber was the preferred crop of the foreign-owned estate sector throughout the 
colonial period from the 1890s (Barlow 1978). Palmoil was first commercially 
planted in 1917, but remained a relatively minor crop until the mid-1950s. During the 
ensuing three decades palmoil proved to be profitable in comparison to rubber and 
expanded in the plantation sector at the expense of rubber. Government policy relating 
to the plantation sector dramatically shifted in emphasis from rubber to palmoil, and 
support for the expansion of palmoil increased by allowing the use of rubber 
replanting grants: grants to replant rubber land with palmoil. The government itself 
played a vigorous role in the expansion of palmoil by embarking on a large 
resettlement effort (especially though the Federal Land Development Authority, 
FELDA) under which palmoil was the ‘crop of choice’ (Plectcher 1991).
1 Malaysia’s 
success in promoting palmoil exports was further aided by inappropriate agricultural and 
economy-wide policies of traditional palmoil exporting countries in Africa (MacBean 
1989, Athukorala 1991). Cocoa gained importance as an alternative crop in the 
plantation sector from about the early 1970s. However, from about the mid-1980s, the 
area of cocoa cultivation contracted sharply because of protracted low world prices of 
cocoa beans. 
As already noted, from around the late 1980s the plantation sector was under 
severe strain arising from the resource-pull effect of rapid structural changes in the 
economy. The resource-pull effect was felt more acutely by the rubber and cocoa 
industries whose cultivation and harvesting processes were more labor intensive 
compared to palmoil. To make matters worse, world prices for these two products 
were unfavourable compared to palmoil. At the end of the crop cycle many plantation 
companies and small-holders partly replanted rubber land with less labor intensive 
crops — in particular palmoil — and used the land for housing and industry.  
                                                 
1 By 1984, FELDA accounted for 28 percent of the 1.3 million ha under palmoil. The annual rate of 
growth of FELDA’s palmoil hectares was 35 percent during 1861-84 and 76 percent during 1961-70, a 
rate six times that of the estate sector over the same period.    6
Many Malaysian rubber estate companies were facing hard times. They first 
employed foreign workers to overcome labor shortages, and then they used their 
technology and managerial know-how to invest in neighbouring countries (in 
particular, Indonesia and the Philippines) where wages and the cost of land were 
lower. Smallholders too went on tapping rubber with hired migrant labor, although 
their higher price elasticity of supply resulted in declining output when output prices 
were low in the early 1990s (Barlow 1997, p. 599).   Despite the natural cushion 
provided by the relative capital intensity of production and also the relatively 
favourable price trend, in recent years the palmoil sector has also felt the pinch of the 
resource-pull effect. Many large plantation companies have shifted investment to 
neighbouring land- and labor-abundant countries. 
Of the three main plantation crops, the area under cultivation of rubber 
increased from 1.7 million hectares in the early 1960s to 2.0 million in the late 
1970s/early 1980s, however it has declined persistently since then reaching 1.3 
million in 2000-04. In the case of palmoil, the area under cultivation increased 
continuously from less than 0.1 million hectares during 1960-64 to 3.8 million during 
2000-04. In both industries, the expansion of output was faster than that of area under 
cultivation, reflecting the widespread use of new high-yielding varieties and improved 
cultivation practices. From the late 1990s, the rubber and palmoil industries benefited 
from increased world demand, particularly from China, and the resultant favourable 
price trends. The palmoil industry benefited further in recent years from the tight 
world supply of edible oils and fats and the expanded demand for biodiesel, which has 
pushed up palmoil prices. In the case of rubber, the supply response to favourable 
prices took the form of increased cropping intensity in the context of a persistent 
decline in area under cultivation. By contrast, the area under cultivation of palmoil 
showed some mild positive response to favourable prices. For cocoa, both production 
and the area under cultivation have declined persistently since the early 1990s. Yield 
per hectare in palmoil increased persistently throughout. In rubber the yield increased 
notably in the 1960s and 1970s, followed by a virtual stagnation.  In fact, the stability 
of rubber yield in face of persistent decline in the total output during the latter period 
came largely from a contraction in the area under cultivation, implying the 
abandonment of marginal plantations with poor yield (Appendix Table A1).  
The small-holder share of total rubber land has always been high and it 
increased from 50 percent in 1960 to 93 percent in 2004, whereas the relatively capital   7
intensive palmoil industry was initially dominated by large plantations although the 
smallholder share rose from 16 percent in 1970 to around 40 percent since 1990 
(Appendix Table A2).
2 The estate dominance is an unusual feature of the palmoil 
industry in Malaysia (and in Indonesia), because smallholder production of palmoil is 
much more important in other parts of the world (Pletcher 1991).    
 
Structural changes: food crops 
 
Rice farming, nearly all of it wet paddy, is the major source of income for rural 
households in the states of the north and east on peninsula Malaysia and in some parts 
of East Malaysia. At the time of independence, about three quarters of native peasant 
producers (predominantly rice growers and fishermen) were Malays, about 90 percent 
of rice growers were Malays, and about one-third of the economically active Malay 
male population were in the peasant sector (Meerman 1979). This ethnic dimension of 
rice farming persisted during the ensuing years, making rice a highly sensitive 
political crop.  
Nearly half of all peasant cultivators grow some rice. The area under 
cultivation of paddy increased from 490 thousand hectares in 1960-64 to 750 
thousand hectares in 1970-74 and has remained near that level since then. Paddy 
production increased persistently from the early 1960s to the mid-1990s though, 
because of increases in yield per hectare from the 1970s. Paddy producers were 
significantly aided by government policies — such as sponsored irrigation schemes 
which permitted double cropping, the introduction of high-yielding varieties, the 
consolidation of paddy smallholdings through group farming in the eight granary 
areas, and direct assistance to farmers in the form of price supports and credit and 
fertilizer subsidies (see below). By the end of the 8
th Malaysia Plan period in 2005, 
almost all farming operations in major paddy growing areas were fully mechanized. 
As a result, the labor input per hectare declined from 47 worker days in 1995 to 15 
worker day in 2000 (Government of Malaysia 2001, p. 214). At the time of 
independence in 1957 about 45 percent of all rice consumed in Malaysia was 
                                                 
2 Note, however, that the bulk of land area classified as small-holding in this data involves farmers who 
participate in large government-run plantation schemes. Smallholders who did not participate in these 
schemes account for only 8 percent of the planted hectare area.   8
imported, but from the mid-1970s around 90 percent of the rice consumed has been 
produced domestically.   
Beginning in the mid-1990s, rice production stagnated and this was followed 
by a mild but persistent decline in recent years despite the yield per hectare 
continuously increasing (Appendix Table A1).  As in the case of plantation crops, 
paddy farming has been under pressure because of labor shortages due to rural-to-
urban labor migration and the aging of the farming community (Ahmad and Tawang 
1999). It seems that continuing massive government support has been of little avail in 
supporting paddy farming in a context of massive pressure emanating from ongoing 
structural adjustment in the economy at large. 
A noteworthy development over the past one-and-a-half decades in non-
plantation agriculture is the rapid growth of output of subsidiary food products — 
fruits, vegetables, fish and livestock — at a faster rate than paddy (Government of 
Malaysia 2006a, p. 51). While there has been some increase in export of these ‘high 
value’ food products, the production expansion so far has been predominantly 
domestic demand derived. This is due to rapid income growth in the modern sector of 
the economy and a high income elasticity of demand for high-value food products 
compared to rice. The relative importance of the subsidiary food sector is bound to 
increase rapidly in years to come.  
Figure 2 provides data on the composition of agricultural production (value 
added) in the Malaysian economy. The dominance of the plantation crop sector in 
Malaysian agriculture has declined steadily from 73 percent in the early 1970s to 53 
percent during 2000-05. Within this sector there has been a noticeable shift in output 
composition away from rubber and towards palmoil. Cocoa accounted for around 10 
percent of total agricultural GDP from the mid-1970s to the early 1990, but its share 
declined, reaching negligible levels by the end of the 20
th Century. The combined 
share of food crops, which remained around 28 percent in the 1960s and 1970s, 
increased sharply during the ensuing years reaching 47 percent in 2000-05. Within 
this sector, the relative importance of paddy has declined sharply over the past two 
decades, reflecting the compositional shift towards livestock, fisheries and other 
subsidiary food crops (mainly fruits and vegetables). 
Agricultural trade 
   9
Dramatic shifts in the domestic production structure were closely mirrored in export 
patterns. The combined share of agricultural products in total merchandise exports 
declined from 58 percent (39 percent when timber/wood exports are excluded) in 1970-
74 to 10 percent (8 percent) by 2000-04 (Table 2). Among agricultural products 
(excluding timber/wood), the share of rubber declined from 62 percent in 1970-74 to just 
under 10 percent in 2000-04. This was offset by an increase in the share of palmoil from 
24 percent to 42 percent.    
Malaysia’s share in total world exports of natural rubber declined from 42 
percent in the late 1970s to around 20 percent by 2004, by which time it was the third 
largest exporter in the world after Thailand and Indonesia (Appendix Figure A2). In 
world crude palmoil exports, Malaysia has remained the largest exporter, accounting 
for a share in total world exports of between 65 and 80 percent from the mid-1970s to 
late 1990s. During the present decade Indonesia has been the world’s largest exporter 
of crude palmoil (accounting for over 50 percent of total world exports). This is due to 
massive investment in relocation by Malaysian plantation companies in the face of 
mounting domestic cost pressure.  
A noteworthy development in the export structure of Malaysia over the past 
two decades has been the emergence of processed food as a dynamic export line. The 
average annual growth rate of processed food exports from Malaysia increased from 5 
percent in 1985-99 to 19 percent in 2000-04. The share of processed food in total 
agricultural exports from Malaysia increased from 9 percent in 1970-74 to 16 percent 
in 1985-89 and then to 32 percent in 2000-04 (Table 2). Rapid expansion of processed 
food compared with the traditional food products (coffee, tea, sugar, cocoa and so on) 
has been a universal phenomenon in world trade over the past two decades 
(Athukorala and Jayasuriya 2003).
3 Malaysia’s recent relative performance in this 
lucrative growth area, while impressive by its own past performance, has lagged 
behind that of many other counties (in particular Thailand) with similar agricultural 
                                                 
3  Powerful forces on both demand and supply sides underpinned this structural shift. On the demand 
side, ‘internationalisation of food habits’ — the increased importance of imported processed items in 
consumption patterns in developed countries as well as among large sections of the populace in many 
developing countries — appeared to play a key role. Factors such as international migration, the 
communications revolution and international tourism have contributed to this phenomenon. This 
significant demand-side impetus seems to have been supported by important supply-side developments 
such as improvements in food technology, refrigeration facilities and transportation that made various 
processed food products, which are generally highly perishable, internationally tradable. Indonesia is 
well placed to benefit from this structural shift in world food trade given its rich agricultural resource 
base and the ample availability of labor (because food processing/packaging for exports is a highly 
labor intensive).      10
resource endowments (Athukorala 2006b). An interesting issue, which deserves 
further analysis, is whether Malaysia’s highly interventionist paddy-sector support 







The prognoses of development prospects for Malaysia (then the Federation of 
Malaya)
4 at the time of transition to independence in 1957 were at best mixed. On the 
positive side, Malaysia’s per capita income was on a par with Hong Kong and Taiwan 
and higher than other countries in East Asia save Japan. Although the rate of 
population increase was already rapid, the highly favourable ratio of land and other 
natural resources to total population offered great potential to raise income per capita. 
The colonial inheritance included well-developed infrastructure, an efficient 
administrative mechanism and a thriving primary export sector with considerable 
potential for expansion.  
The mobilisation of this development potential for building the new 
independent Malaysian economy had to be done under conflicting challenges posed 
by a plural society inherited from the colonial past. At the time, the native Malays, 
who accounted for 52 percent of the population, dominated politics, but were 
relatively poor, and were involved mostly in low-productivity agricultural activities. 
The ethnic Chinese (37 percent of the population) enjoyed greater economic power 
and dominated most of the modern-sector activities, but they did not match the ethnic 
solidarity or political power of the Malay.
5 While ethnic divisions weakened the 
national fabric, the machinery of government was fragile and the democratic political 
leadership remained untested. In this context, there was little room for optimism 
regarding the development policies that might be expected from the newly elected 
                                                 
4 The Federation of Malaya, comprising 11 states in the Malay Peninsula secured independence from 
Britain on 31 August 1957. Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore joined Malaya to form Malaysia on 16 
September 1963. Singapore left the federation in August 1965.  
5 The emergence of these three identifiable and mutually exclusive ethnic groups as distinct, self conscious 
groups stemmed in substantial part from the exigencies and priorities of the British colonial policies 
(Gnguli 1997, p. 235).   11
government (World Bank 1955). All in all, challenges of development for Malaysia 
were generally considered more problematic compared to a number of other countries 
newly emerged from the colonial era — in particular India, Pakistan, Ghana, Kenya, 
and Burma.
6 
In the early years of independence up to the mid-1960s, Malaysian national 
development policy was much in line with the traditional liberal notions of the limited 
state.  Public command of economic resources in these early years was low, and the 
prevailing economic policies conservative. The policy thrust was basically to continue 
with the colonial open-door policy stance relating to trade and industry, while 
attempting to redress ethnic and regional economic imbalances through rural 
development schemes and the provision of social and physical infrastructure 
(Snodgrass 1980).   
As in many other developing countries, industrialization through import 
substitution was a key part of the Malaysian development strategy during this period. 
However, Malaysian policy makers, unlike their counterparts in other countries, 
eschewed ‘forced’ industrialization through direct import restrictions and the 
establishment of state-owned industrial enterprises (Lim 1992).
7 Moderate tariff 
protection was by and large the key instrument used in encouraging new investment in 
manufacturing. The average tariff rate in 1965 was estimated at a mere 13 per cent 
and very few industries enjoyed nominal tariffs of more than 30 per cent. Non-tariff 
barriers were almost non-existent (Powel 1971, Lin 1984).   
The racial riots in Kuala Lumpur in 1969 brought about a dramatic shift in 
development policy along ethnic lines. The leadership of the ruling National Front 
concluded that the striking discrepancies in wealth must be rapidly eliminated, in part 
though public activity, if Malaysia were to evolve into an integrated community. Its 
two basic goals were the eradication of poverty by raising income levels and 
increasing opportunities for all Malaysians irrespective of race, and rapid reordering 
of society to correct economic imbalances so as to reduce, and eventually eliminate, 
the identification of race with economic function (Government of Malaysia 1971, p. 
1).  However, it was also said, in the language of NEP, that an increasing share of 
                                                 
6 In the famous Rosentein-Rodan (1961) growth trajectory up to 1976 for sixty-six of todays 
developing countries, Malaysia was classified (together with South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, 
Thailand and Indonesia) in the ‘low-growth’ category. 
7 In a recent comprehensive study of the patterns and chronology of trade policy reforms during the 
postwar era, Sachs and Warner (1995, Table 1) identify Malaysia as one of eight developing countries 
whose trade regimes remained open throughout the post-Second World War period.   12
GNP to Malays was not to be at the cost of citizens belonging to other ethnic groups. 
Given the delicate ethnic composition of the ruling coalition, economic equality was 
to be fostered primarily through increasing employment and devising a mechanism to 
ensure that a greater share of newly created assets would accrue to the Malay. 
Redistribution of existing assets was anathema. Neither expropriation, foreign or 
local, nor nationalization, nor land reform was considered in the NEP (Ness 1967, 
Snodgrass 1980, Ganguli 2003).      
Given the crucial role played by foreign-owned companies in the production 
and marketing of plantation crops, the Malaysian government took care to pursue a 
favourable and unambiguous policy stance toward direct foreign investment. 
Transferring a progressively large share of these companies to the nationals was a 
declared policy objective, but the government always made it clear that the transfer of 
ownership would be through formal share trading rather than through arbitrary 
expropriation (Mynt 1984, Fletcher 1991). 
There was a heavy emphasis on the promotion of heavy industries through 
direct government involvement in the first half of 1980s, as part of the ‘look East’ 
policy of Dr. Mahathir who became Prime Minister in 1981. The symbol of the 
selective industrial policy was the Proton (the Malaysian national car) project: a joint 
venture of HICOM and the Mitsubishi Corporation in Japan. By 1987, there were 867 
corporate public enterprises in Malaysia, more than one-third of which were in 
manufacturing. Tariffs on a wide range of manufactured goods were substantially 
increased in the first half of 1980s as part of the heavy-industrialisation move. 
However, there was no significant reliance on quantitative import restrictions 
(Athukorala and Menon 1999).  
The economic crisis during 1985-87 — which was caused by a combination of 
adverse price trends in Malaysia’s major export products, and budget deficits due to 
the move towards heavy industrialisation — put an end to the state-led heavy 
industrialisation push. The crisis management policy package placed greater emphasis 
on the role of the private sector and strengthened the conditions for export-oriented 
industrialization through greater participation of FDI. The structural adjustment 
reform package subsequently introduced involved the gradual privatization and 
restructuring of state-owned enterprises. By the early 1990s, state-ownership in 
manufacturing was limited only to some politically sensitive ventures in automobile   13
manufacturing (the Proton project), petrochemical, iron and steel, and cement 
industries. Reforms in the late 1980s also involved significant tariff reductions and the 
removal of quantitative import restrictions. Some of the tariff increases introduced in 
the first half of the 1980s were reversed, and further tariff cuts were introduced as part 
of market-oriented reforms in the late 1980s.  
Malaysia’s policy response to the recent (1997-98) financial crisis involved 
some departure from persistent trade liberalisation over the previous decade 
(Athukorala 2003). The 1998 Budget speech announced increased import duties on 
automobiles, vans and motorcycles: from 30-200 per cent to 40-300 per cent for CBU 
(completely built-up) motor cars; from 4-42 per cent to 30-80 per cent for CKD 
(completely knocked down) motor cars; and from 0-35 per cent to 5-50 per cent for 
construction equipment. In addition, a number of other products — heavy and 
construction equipment, hot and cold rolled flat products of iron or non-alloy steel, 
ephedrine and its salts, chemical products, and certain electrical household goods — 
were brought under non-automatic import licensing. The declared purpose of these 
measures was to bring down the current account deficit; but cushioning local 
producers (including the national car producer, Proton) against domestic demand 
contraction was obviously a key motivating factor. There was, however, no notable 
retreat from the country’s general long-standing commitment to a highly open trade 
regime. 
Despite recent tariff increases, the average applied import duty rate (total duty 
collection as a percentage of total merchandise exports) has declined persistently 
(Appendix Figure A3). The underlying tariff structure is far from uniform, however. 
The domestic automobile market is heavily protected through both tariff and non-
tariff measures. At the 2-digit level of the Harmonized System (HS) of products, the 
average nominal tariff on automobiles is 30 per cent while all the other tariff rates are 
around or below 20 per cent.
8 The overall tariff structure in Malaysia is heavily 
‘cascading’ in nature: tariffs are generally higher on final goods than on production 
inputs (intermediate and capital goods) (Athukorala 2005).   
                                                 
8 Tariff rates reported in this paper unless otherwise stated are from Malaysia’s latest (2003) tariff 
schedule available in the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) Secretariat online database.    14
As part of WTO commitments, Malaysia has bound 65 percent of its tariff 
lines. The bound rates are much higher than the applied MFN rates (WTO 2002)
9. 
Both of these features of the tariff structure gave the government scope to raise 
applied tariffs (as was done in 1998), imparting a degree of uncertainty to applied 
tariffs. There are no import quotas in Malaysia, and existing import prohibitions are 
limited only to those implemented for national security reasons. By the mid-1990s, 
only 4.5 per cent of all tariff lines had non-ad-valorem tariffs, and this declined 
further to 0.7 per cent by 2002 because of the further rationalization of the tariff 
structure following signing of the WTO Agreement in 1995. There are no tariff quotas 
or variable import levies (Athukorala 2002). By 2000 the coverage ratio of non-tariff 
barriers in import trade (unweighted percentage)
10 amounted to 2.3 percent, down 
from 3.7 percent in the mid-1990s. Despite recent tariff increases, Malaysia’s average 
tariff rate is relatively low (both in terms of the simple average and import-weighted 
average) by regional standards. However, the degree of dispersion of tariff rates in 
Malaysia (measured by the coefficient of variation) is relatively high because of high 
tariffs for a few product lines, especially motor vehicles (Athukorala 2005). 
 
Agricultural trade policy: plantation crops 
 
Duties on the two major primary export commodities — rubber and palmoil — were a 
major source of government revenue until the mid-1980s. Subsequently, duty rates 
were adjusted in line with world price trends in order to keep producer prices stable 
over time. Export duties were reduced sharply from the mid-1980s, in a context where 
the viability of certain industries was under persistent, severe strain because of labor 
shortages and rising wages propelled by dramatic structural changes in the economy 
under export-led industrialisation (Ariff and Semudram 1990, Chunanuntathum et al. 
1990). The reduction of export duties was aided by tax buoyancy in a rapidly growing 
economy and by increasing government revenue from petroleum exports.    
The import duty rates on rubber and palmoil, which increased persistently in 
the 1960s and 1970s, have declined over the past two decades. During 2000-04 the 
                                                 
9  In 2002, the simple averages bound, unbound, and applied tariff rates were 19 percent, 35 percent 
and 9.2 percent respectively. All agricultural tariff lines were bound, but on average at much higher 
levels compared to manufacturing tariffs.  
10 Calculated as percentage of  import value of HS6 tariff lines affected by NTBs in total imports   15
average annual duty rate was 4.7 percent on rubber and 1.1 percent on palmoil. The 
higher duty rate on rubber as compared to palmoil was because of the additional duty 
(cess) still levied in order to finance the rubber replanting scheme. Duties (in the 
range of 5 percent to 10 percent) are levied on specific grades of crude palmoil with a 
view to promoting further domestic processing. By the dawn of the New Millennium, 
only a few other primary products (such as some forest products and crude oil) were 
subject to export duties. Total export duties contributed a mere 2 percent to total 
government revenue (Government of Malaysia 2006b).  
As structural changes in the economy begun to severely impede the long-term 
viability of plantation crops, conventional trade policy and direct government support 
in the form of funding research and replanting schemes by and large lost their 
relevance. Consequently, in recent years policy attention has shifted towards new 
issues such as: forging linkages between the agricultural sector and rapidly growing 
manufacturing sectors; improving the productivity and efficiency of certain 
agricultural sectors; and assisting plantation companies to relocate to other countries 
where factor market conditions enable profitable production. Relaxing restrictions on 
labor importation, both formally and informally (that is, by turning blind eye on illicit 
immigration) has also become an important short-tem measure to reduce labor market 
pressures (Athukorala 2006a).    
 
Agricultural trade policy: food crops 
 
Paddy/rice remained the single most assisted crop in Malaysia since the guaranteed 
price scheme was introduced by the colonial government in 1949 (Meerman 1979, 
Ness 1967, Rudnr 1994, Fletcher 1989, Zubaidi 1992). The emphasis on assisting 
farmers gained added impetus following independence, and in particular as part of the 
NEP. 
The government has assisted rice producers with an all-encompassing 
guaranteed minimum price scheme (GMP), a price subsidy scheme, and a fertilizer 
subsidy. In 1998 (the latest year for which data are available) total government 
expenditure on the three schemes amounted to RM 547 million (US$ 150 million) or 
about 3 percent of total value added of this crop. The GMP scheme was first 
introduced in 1949 and the minimum price was subsequently adjusted in 1973, 1994, 
1979, 1980, 1984 and 1997. Under this scheme BERNAS (a state-trading company)   16
undertakes to buy paddy from farmers at no less than the guaranteed minimum price 
(since 2000 RM 5.49 per kg). BERNAS procures paddy from farmers and mill rice as 
a business operation. It competes with other private millers in the procurement of 
paddy and marketing of its milled rice. BERNAS purchases about 45 percent of the 
marketable surplus paddy available. Only BERNAS is permitted to import rice (at 
zero duty) into the country. It undertakes to import rice and implement the rice price 
subsidy program under a long-term contract with the government. The volume of 
import is determined by BERNAS as equivalent to the shortfall of production over 
consumption. Rice millers are required to produce 30 percent of their output at 
standard and premium quality. As they are free to determine prices for superior 
quality rice, profits realized on this quality rice are used to cross-subsidize the 
minimum production required for standard and medium quality.           
A cash subsidy for every tonne of paddy sold was introduced in 1980 and was 
further increased in 1984 and 1990. Under this scheme the government makes a fixed 
payment (currently RM 2.48 per kg) to farmers for paddy sold by them to any 
commercial rice mill. The subsidy is in addition to the GMP received by farmers. The 
fertilizer subsidy scheme has been operation since 1985. There was also a subsidies 
credit scheme for paddy farmers. This was terminated in 1996. In 2004, total 
government outlay on the price subsidy and fertilizer subsidy amounted to RM 477 
million (about 2 percent of paddy sector value added). In addition to these direct 
subsidies, the government assists paddy farmer by providing drainage and irrigation 
facilities, and management and extension services. Total outlay on these support 





Despite some instances of policy slippage, by and large Malaysia’s macroeconomic 
policy was sound over the period under analysis: supporting growth and structural 
transition in real sectors. Budget deficits were generally kept within prudent limits 
while minimising the use of borrowed funds. The government continued to strictly 
adhere to the colonial policy of eschewing borrowing from the central bank for 
budgetary purposes. When overall deficits arose occasionally, they were financed 
from non-inflationary domestic sources, in particular private savings accumulated in   17
the Employee’s Provident Fund (EPF). Moreover, broadening of the tax base in a 
booming economy, coupled with greater efficiency in tax collection, brought about a 
rapid increase in government revenue. For the first time in Malaysian history, the 
Federal Government achieved a balanced overall budget in 1993 and this was 
maintained in subsequent years. Compared to the 1986-89 period, the public sector 
was a net saver during 1990-96. The fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP turned 
around from a annual average deficit of 2.5 percent to a surplus of 1.5 percent 
between these two periods. Deficits financing, however, re-emerged as part of the 
policy response to the 1997-98 financial crisis. The budget deficit as a percentage of 
GDP increased from 1.8 percent in 1998 to 5.2 percent in 2002. However, it has come 
down since then, reaching 3.5 percent in 2006.  
The Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia or BNM) has 
maintained an impressive track record, by developing country standards, in 
maintaining domestic price stability and averting real exchange rate misalignment 
(Corden 1996, Athukorala 2001). As part of the macroeconomic adjustment package 
introduced in 1986, greater flexibility was introduced to the basket peg. BNM’s policy 
was to allow the exchange rate to reflect underlying trends of the economy, while 
intervening in the foreign exchange market to smooth excessive fluctuation in the 
exchange rate movements caused by fluctuations in short-term capital inflows. As can 
be seen in Appendix Figure A4, this policy was successful in achieving a significant 
depreciation of the overall real exchange rate (denoted RER-TP) from 1987 to about 
1993. There was a mild appreciation of the real exchange rate in the three years 
leading up to the financial crisis in 1997, reflecting macroeconomic imbalances in the 
booming economy. The crisis was instrumental in reversing that appreciation. Despite 
the fixing of the exchange rate of the ringgit against the US dollar (at Ringgit 3.8 per 
dollar) in September 1998
11 and deficit financing as part of the crisis management 
package, by 2000 the real exchange rate had depreciated by almost 20 percent against 
the pre-crisis levels and it has remained virtually unchanged in subsequent years.  
Note from Appendix Figure A4 that, over the past three decades, the RER for 
the export crop sector (RER-AG) has been behaving quite differently from the overall 
RER (denoted RER-TP). Notwithstanding some periodic depreciation triggered by 
                                                 
11 The ringgit peg to the US$ was abandoned in favor of a managed float system with 
effect from 21 July 2005. 
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increases in world commodity prices,  RER-AG has appreciated steadily over the past 
two-and-a-half decades. This contrast reflects the ongoing structural transformation of 
the economy that has resulted in a persistent deterioration of the relative profitability 
of the traditional plantation crops sector. 
 
 
Trends and patterns of agricultural incentives 
 
 
This section provides an analysis of the changing extent and patterns of direct and 
indirect distortions to incentives faced by domestic agriculture in Malaysia using the 
methodology developed by Anderson et al. (2008). The main focus of the present 
study’s methodology is on government-imposed distortions that create a gap between 
domestic prices and what they would be under free markets. Since it is not possible to 
understand the characteristics of agricultural development with a sectoral view alone, 
the project’s methodology not only estimates the effects of direct agricultural policy 
measures but it also includes estimates of distortions in non-agricultural tradable 
sectors for comparative evaluation. Specifically, Nominal Rates of Assistance (NRAs) 
for the four covered products are compared with NRAs for nonagricultural tradables 
by calculating indices of  Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA).  In these calculations, 
non-covered agricultural products are assumed to have an average NRA of zero, and it 
is assumed the shares of non-covered farm production made up of exportables, 
importables and nontradables are one-third each. 
Before turning to the estimates, it is important to bear in mind two important 
limitations of the estimates which we were not able to avoid because of data 
unavailability. First, in the case of the three plantation crops, we ignore potential 
differences between border (reference) prices and domestic prices arising from qualify 
differences. This possibly infuses an underestimation bias into our calculations. 
Second, in all cases we have assumed complete pass-through of changes in producer 
(wholesale) prices to farm-gate prices. This potentially introduces an upward bias in 
our estimates. These limitations are, however, only important in comparing the effect 
on incentives among products or across countries at a given point in time. They are 
unlikely to distort inferences based on inter-temporal comparison (changes in   19
incentives over time) because the magnitude of the bias is unlikely to be time-variant. 
It is also important to note that the RRA estimates, due to the estimation method, do 
not fully capture distortions to agricultural incentives arising from changes in tariffs 
on tradable inputs. Given the cascading nature of  Malaysia’s  tariff structure, this is a 
potentially important source of downward bias in the RRA estimates (Athukorala 
2006c).  
The estimates of direct distortions to incentives are reported as five-year 
averages in Table 3 and shown annually in summary form in Fig Figure 2. The 
average NRA for all covered products was negative from 1960 to 1984, but its 
magnitude declined over the period, with the 5-year average fluctuating between 0 
and 3 percent from the mid-1980s. However, this aggregate picture conceals very high 
assistance provided to paddy farmers. 
NRA estimates for individual commodities point to broadly similar patterns in 
changes in incentives faced by the two major plantation products, rubber and palmoil 
(Table 3). In both cases, the NRA was negative throughout but the absolute magnitude 
declined sharply over the past two decades, reflecting cuts in export duties. However, 
with the exception of some early years, the degee of negative incentive to the palmoil 
industry was much lower in magnitude compared to that for rubbber. For the entire 
period of 1960-2004, the annual average NRA for palmoil was -7.5 compared to -11.5 
for rubber. Given the fact that fortunes of both products have been predominently 
determined by domestic resource-pull effects, arising from rapid structural adjustment 
in the wider economy, the mainly relatively high negative assistance to rubber 
compared to palmoil remains a puzzling feature of the structure of incentives in 
Malaysia. Cocoa was never taxed heavily, as it was always considered a minor export 
crop. The NRA for this product varied between 0 percent and -3 percent over the 
period. 
Among the four  products under study, paddy rice is notable for its persistently 
high rate of assistance. The NRA for paddy/rice in the 1960s and early 1970s had an 
average level of 8.5 percent, although there was a high degree of annual fluctuation. It 
averaged almost 40 percent in 1975-79 following an upward adjustment in the 
guaranteed minuimum pric (GMP). It then reached a peak average of 158 percent in 
the 5-year period 1985-89 following the introduction of a price subsidy (over and 
above the GMP). Over the past two-and-a-half decades, the NRA for paddy has more 
than halved but in 2000-04 was still above 70 percent. The disaggregated data show   20
that the farm-gate price of paddy continued to be high with only periodic upward 
shifts resulting from increases in the GMP and the price subsidy (Appendix Figure 
A5d). In this context, the year-to-year variations in the NRA prodominently come 
from changes in the reference (border) price. For instance, the dramatic decline in 
NRA from 127 percent in 1990-94 to 57 percent in 1995-99 was brought about by 
sharp decline in world rice prices between these two periods. The NRA then increased 
to 71 reflecting some recovery in world prices. 
Finally, a comparison of the weighted-average NRA for the three exportables 
(rubber, palmoil and cocoa) with that for the importable (which in this case is solely 
represented by paddy) points to a persistent bias in agricultural incentives in favor of 
import-competing, as against export-oriented, production (row 6 of Table 4). Based 
on similar estimates for the period 1960-1982, Jenkins and Lai (1991) inferred that 
excessive protection accorded to paddy farmers had a negative effect on the expansion 
of export agriculture. This inference does not seem valid for the period from about the 
late 1980s: continuous deterioration in the profitability of export-oriented agriculture 
as well as paddy production are predominently rooted in the ongoing process of 
strutural transformation of the wider economy. However, as already noted, heavy 
assistance to paddy producers is presumably a major source of distortion within the 
food-crop sector, which constrains resource reallocation from the structurally-weak 
paddy sector to high-value food production, for both the domestic and export markets.  
The NRA to non-agricultural tradables sectors, which recorded a mild decline 
in the 1960s and 1970s, plummeted from then on reaching almost zero by the turn of 
the century. Both direct tariff cuts and rapid expansion of export-oriented 
manufacturing, which enjoys duty free status for all imported inputs in the production 
process, contributed to this decline. Disaggregated data (not reported here for brevety) 
show that the latter continued to act as a much more powerful force compared to the 
former. 
As a consequence of these changes in both agricultural and non-agricultural 
assistance, the relative rate of assistance has gradually moved from being quite 
negative in the earlier decades to now being almost zero on average (Table 4). It 
needs to be noted, however, that this does not mean there are no further economic 
gains to be had from further policy reform. On the contrary, as shown at the bottom of 
Table 3, the dispersion of NRAs within the farm sector has not declined very much   21
over time, so there is still scope for improved resource reallocation were the 






Malaysia stands out among developing countries for its long-standing commitment to 
maintaining a relatively open trade and investment policy regime. Malaysia has 
persistently eschewed a heavy reliance on quantitative restrictions and other forms of 
non-tariff protection. Tariffs on both domestic manufacturing and agriculture continue 
to be low relative to other developing countries. Export taxes, which were important 
sources of government revenue until about the mid-1980s, reduced over the years as 
the plantation sector experienced severe cost pressure emanating from rapid growth 
and structural change under export-led industrialization. The average level of import 
tariffs also decreased significantly over time, notwithstanding periodic upward 
adjustment of some tariffs and the special case of continuing heavy protection of the 
automotive industry. Malaysia’s record of a commitment to openness is particularly 
remarkable in that it reflects unilateral and voluntary policy choices, rather than 
pressure from major trading partners or from conditionally imposed donor agency 
multilateral negotiations under the auspices of the GATT/WTO.  
Nonetheless, there are notable anomalies in the incentive structure in Malaysia 
that encourage the channelling of resources into inefficient activities. In particular, the 
tariff structure is characterized by a dualistic pattern in which export-oriented 
production takes place under a virtual free trade regime side-by-side predominantly 
domestic market oriented production, both in manufacturing and agriculture, assisted 
by tariff protection. The tariff structure is also characterized by a high degree of 
dispersion of tariff rates because of high tariff peaks relating to a few product lines, 
and by increased reliance on non-automatic import licensing to regulate imports of a 
significant number of products that directly compete with domestic production of 
public sector enterprises. This significant departure from neutrality implies ample 
room for policy discretion, as opposed to pure economic policy, in influencing 
resource allocation in the economy.    22
  Excessive assistance given to paddy farmers remains a major distortion in 
agricultural incentives in Malaysia. In addition to the obvious welfare implications, 
this anomaly presumably hinders the diversification of domestic agriculture towards 
new dynamic product lines. Given the ongoing process of dramatic structural 
transformation of the economy — which has ushered in an era of massive urban-to-
rural labor migration and places cost pressures on traditional agriculture — the case 
for protecting paddy farmers on self-sufficiency grounds has lost relevance. Outright 
dismantling of assistance remains virtually a non-option because of political-economy 
considerations. Nonetheless, there is a strong case for replacing the existing 
complicated and costly incentives with direct income support to farmers. The fiscal 
burden of this is unlikely to be high because the agricultural labor force has been 
rapidly depleting and the incidence of rural poverty, though relatively high by national 
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a Excluding forestry and forestry products. 
Source:  Compiled from Economic Planning Agency data (see Appendix Table A3).  
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Figure 2: Nominal rates of assistance to exportable, import-competing and all
 covered 



















































































































Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
   3
Figure 3: Nominal rates of assistance to all agricultural and nonagricultural tradable 












































































































Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 









Agri. Share in 
employment 
1970-74 2.3  3.4 25.5 50.9 
1975-79 7.3  5.2 23.3 46.4 
1980-84 6.6  3.4 20.4 39.5 
1985-89 4.8  4.3 19.1 32.4 
1990-94 9.3  0.2 15.3 26.9 
1995-99 5.2  0.1 10.1 17.9 
2000-04 5.2  3.8 8.7 15.0 
2005 5.3  2.1 8.5 13.7 
 
Source:  Ministry of Finance (various issues).   2
Table 2: Share of agricultural exports in total merchandise exports, composition of 





 1970-74 1975-79 1985-89 1995-99  2000-04
Agri. share in exports  58 54 36 13  10
(excluding timber/ wood)  39 38 24 11  8
       
Composition of agricultural exports:
a  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
   Rubber  62.4 52.9 33.7 12.9  9.7
   Palmoil  23.9 27.5 31.9 44.1  41.6
   Cocoa  2.1 2.3 6.4 2.5  2.6
   Spices  2.2 2.1 1.5 1.1  0.8
   Processed food  8.7 8.5 15.6 26.2  31.6
       
Malaysia’s world market shares:           
   Rubber  62.1 56.8 36.7 19.9  19.3
   Palmoil  70.3 77 74.5 64.3  54.5
   Cocoa  3.1 3.3 11.4 4.0  4.3
 
a  Excluding timber/ wood. 
 
Sources: Ministry of Finance (various issues) and Bank Negara Malaysia (various 
issues). 




    1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
           
Exportables 
a  -12.1 -9.6  -13.4  -20.0  -12.8 -5.6 -4.7 -3.6 -1.6 
Palmoil  -11.4  -10.6  -15.2  -15.0 -5.8 -3.2 -3.1 -3.0 -1.1 
Cocoa  0.0 -1.2 -2.8 -1.7 -1.5 -1.4 -2.3 -2.1  0.0 
Rubber  -12.1 -9.5  -12.8  -22.5  -18.2 -8.7 -8.1 -6.8 -4.7 
           
Import-competing products 
a  19.1 -1.9  3.1 39.2 93.8  158.0  127.2 57.4 71.0 
Rice  19.1 -1.9  3.1 39.2 93.8  158.0  127.2 57.4 71.0 
           
Total of covered products 
a  -8.4 -8.7  -10.5  -15.3 -5.7  1.8  3.4 -0.3  2.4 
Dispersion of covered products 
b  30.6 18.5 21.1 43.8 53.4 65.8 57.3 36.7 43.2 
%  coverage  (at  undistorted  prices)  86 86 86 85 80 75 67 59 57 
 
a Weighted averages, with weights based on the unassisted value of production.  
 
b Dispersion is a simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around the weighted mean of NRAs of covered products. 
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 2
Table 4: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to non-agricultural industries, Malaysia, 1960 to 2004 
(percent) 
    1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Covered products 
a  -8.4 -8.7  -10.5  -15.3 -5.7  1.8  3.4 -0.3  2.4 
Non-covered  products    0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
All agricultural products 
a  -7.2 -7.5 -9.0  -13.0 -4.6  1.3  2.3 -0.2  1.3 
Non-product  specific  (NPS)  assistance    0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total agricultural NRA (incl. NPS) 
b  -7.2 -7.5 -9.0  -13.0 -4.6  1.3  2.3 -0.2  1.3 
Trade bias index 
c  -0.22 -0.06 -0.14 -0.31 -0.35 -0.33 -0.28 -0.12 -0.12 
           
Assistance to just tradables:           
   All agricultural tradables  -7.6  -7.9  -9.4  -13.7  -4.9  1.4  2.6  -0.2  1.5 
      All  non-agricultural  tradables  7.4 7.0 7.1 6.5 5.2 3.9 2.8 2.0 0.9 
Relative rate of assistance, RRA 
d  -14.0  -13.9  -15.5  -18.9 -9.6 -2.4 -0.3 -2.2  0.6 
a NRAs including product-specific input subsidies. 
b NRAs including product-specific input subsidies and non-product-specific (NPS) assistance. Total of assistance to primary factors and intermediate inputs divided to total 
value of primary agriculture production at undistorted prices (%). 
c Trade bias index is TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1, where NRAagm and NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs for the import-competing and exportable 
parts of the agricultural sector. 




t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and 
non-agricultural sectors, respectively.  
e These memo items show what the average NRAag, Trade bias index and RRA would be if the distortions in the market for foreign currency, as 
captured by the methodology outlined in Appendix 1 of this book, are ignored. 
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
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Appendix Figure A1:  Contribution of agriculture
1 to GDP and employment, 





















































































































Agri. share in GDP (%)
Agri. share in employment%
 
1  Agriculture, forestry and fishing. 
Source: Based on data compiled from Ministry of Finance (various issues) 
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Appendix Figure A2: Malaysia’s share of world exports of natural rubber, cocoa and 






























































































Source:  Based on data compiled from Department of Statistics (2002) and Bank 
Negara Malaysia (various issues).  
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Appendix Figure A3:  Average rate of import duty,


































































































a   Total duty collection as a percentage of total merchandise imports (excluding re-
exports) 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Kuala Lumpur (various 
issues) 
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Appendix Figure A4: Real exchange rate, Malaysia, 1980 to 2005 

















































































Note:  1.  Normalized at the mean. 
Legend:   RER-TP    Real exchange rate for tradable;  RER-TAE    Real exchange rate 
for traditional agricultural exports (rubber, palmoil and cocoa) 
Source: Appendix Table A6 
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Appendix Figure A5: Prices for primary products, Malaysia, 1960 to 2005
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Appendix Figure A5 (continued): Prices for primary products, Malaysia, 1960 to 2005 
 
 














































































































































































Domestic price Border price NRA
 
 
Source:   Appendix Table A5 
 Appendix Table A1: Area under cultivation, production and yield of major agricultural 




  1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
 
Rubber 
         
Crop  are,  000  Ha  1664 1797 1999 1995 1994 1867 1759 1576 1319 
Production,    ‘000  tons  821 1120 1430 1577 1522 1497 1138  865 1010 
Yield  (tons  per  Ha)  494 601 695 784 754 661 657 591 675 
 
Palmoil 
         
Crop  are,  000  Ha  66  205  484  863 1186 1812 2310 3056 3759 
Production,  ‘000  tons  109  296  885 1910 1871 5255 6990 9434  13201 
Yield  (tons  per  Ha)  1649 1475 1706 2077 1600 2290 3008 3059 3390 
 
Cocoa 
         
Crop  are,  000  Ha  ---  ---  ---  --- 234 383 308 121  45 
Production,  ‘000  tons  --- --- --- --- 75  210  192 94 41 
Yield  (tons  per  Ha)  ---  ---  ---  --- 305 490 621 751 905 
 
Paddy/rice 
         
Crop  are,  000  Ha  493 644 749 699 668 665 684 688 674 
Production,  ‘000  tons  1057 1428 1945 1906 1791 1734 2062 2094 1747 
Yield  (tons  per  Ha)  2188 2163 2544 2684 2716 2584 2934 3062 3211 
 
Source:   Department of Statistics (2002, 2005).   2
Appendix Table A2:  Small holder share in total cultivated area of rubber and palmoil, 





   Rubber Palmoil 
1960 50 17 
1970 67 16 
1980 75 35 
1990 82 40 
2004 93 40 
 
Source:   Department of Statistics (2002, 2005).   3
Appendix Table A3: Composition of agricultural GDP, Malaysia, 1965 to 2005 
(percent) 
 
  1965-69 1970-74 1975-80 1980-84  1985-99 1990-94 1995-99  2000-5 
Plantation  crops  71.3 72.9 71.2 68.7 64.8 60.8 54.8 53.2
    Rubber  57.2  53.5 37.3 32.8 27.8 19.1  14.2 12.1
    Palmoil  10.9  15.2 21.4 24.5 26.8 31.4  35.1 40.1
    Cocoa  3.2  4.2 12.3 10.1 10.5 10.3  5.5 1.0
Food  crops  28.7 27.1 28.8 31.3 35.2 39.2 45.2 46.8
    Paddy  14.4  13.3 14.1 12.0 9.2 5.7  3.9 3.6
    Livestock  2.3  2.5 3.0 4.4 5.3 6.9  8.5 10.5
    Fisheries  5.5  5.7 5.9 8.3 11.6 14.5  15.6 14.5
    Other  6.5  5.6 5.8 8.6 12.5 15.3  17.1 18.3
 
Source:  Compiled from various published planning documents (Government of Malaysia 
1971, 1997, 2001, 2006). 
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Appendix Table A4: Export duty rates on rubber and palmoil exports, Malaysia, 1960 to 
2004  
 
    (percent,  five-year  averages)   
 
  1960-64 1965-69  1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Rubber 8.4 6.7  9.0 23.2 17.3 7.3 6.1  4.7 4.7
Palmoil 7.7 7.8  11.6 15.9 4.7 1.7 1.1  0.8 1.1
 
Source:  Ministry of Finance (various issues) and Bank Negara Malaysia (various issues). 
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Appendix Table A5: Prices for primary products, Malaysia, 1960 to 2005 
(current RM local currency) 
  Rubber Crude  Palmoil  Cocoa  Paddy/rice 
  DP BP    DP BP    DP BP    DP BP   
1960 2,089  2440  573  646  ---  ---  265  206 
1961 1,630  1863  596  672  ---  ---  265  219 
1962 1,562  1718  560  615  ---  ---  265  239 
1963 1,484  1632  545  603  ---  ---  265  232 
1964 1,397  1649  593  705  ---  ---  265  219 
1965 1,399  1548  691  766  ---  ---  265  212 
1966 1,358  1524  600  681  ---  ---  265  239 
1967 1,151  1267  566  637  1270  1280  265  295 
1968 1,086  1170  401  441  1464  1511  265  326 
1969 1,388  1551  395  443  2134  2183  265  317 
1970 1,097  1209  607  676  1799  1813  265  258 
1971 1,008  1193  613  741  1429  1447  265  221 
1972  873 958 471 534  1252  1270  265  222 
1973 1,360  1530  519  585  1764  1888  381  395 
1974  1,561 1935  945  1269 2840 2961  464 603 
1975  1,195 1410  887  1137 3020 2988  464 561 
1976 1,521  1858  780  884  3220  3250  464  267 
1977  1,591 2084 1,019 1302 3000 3037  464 254 
1978  1,637 2214 1,094 1226 3100 3284  464 365 
1979  1,896 2680 1,172 1281 3200 3260  530 408 
1980  2,164 3027 1,071 1153 3250 3308  530 412 
1981  1,963 2507 1,064 1139 4061 4101  698 524 
1982 1,698  1955  938  987  3439  3476  698  385 
1983  2,018 2361  993  1023 3992 4023  698 269 
1984  2,054 2373 1,451 1567 5112 5267  663 249 
1985  1,769 1846 1,189 1180 5026 4844  663 227 
1986 1,952  2128  684  706  4676  4743  663  245 
1987 2,253  2587  789  859  4342  4645  663  188 
1988  3,006 3406 1,078 1138 3740 3899  663 313 
1989 2,467  2632  933  936  3073  3040  663  407 
1990 2,141  2305  767  782  2758  2784  744  334 
1991 2,230  2406  897  918  2744  2778  744  373 
1992  2,131 2409  964  1030 2507 2655  744 301 
1993  2,128 2311  976  1001 2468 2514  744 280 
1994  2,732 2923 1,253 1287 3167 3224  744 370 
1995  3,838 4040 1,513 1555 3274 3315  744 343 
1996  3,434 3625 1,287 1312 3236 3266  744 399 
1997  2,771 3185 1,414 1556 3686 4020  798 751 
1998  2,720 2860 2,355 2367 5846 5846  798 633 
1999  2,242 2382 1,603 1615 4394 4394  798 526 
2000  2,488 2629 1,111 1122 2879 2879  798 517 
2001 2,154  2294  929  944  3494  3494  798  423 
2002  2,545 2685 1,352 1367 5222 5222  798 438 
2003  3,647 3788 1,602 1617 6313 6313  798 484 
2004  4,563 4704 1,691 1706 5575 5575  798 483 
2005   ---  ---    ---  ---   5434  5434  798  476   6
 
DP  Domestic price (RM per MT)   BP  Border price (RM per MT)      
---  No data available 
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet using methodology from Anderson et al. (2008)   7
Appendix Table A6: Foreign exchange rates, Malaysia, 1960 to 2005 
(RM/US$) 
  Official rate  Black market rate  Real exchange rate (RER) 
     RER-TP
1 RER-AG
1 
1960 3.06  3.12  ---  --- 
1961 3.05  3.11  ---  --- 
1962 3.06  3.08  ---  --- 
1963 3.06  3.09  ---  --- 
1964 3.07  3.21  ---  --- 
        
1965 3.06  3.09  ---  --- 
1966 3.08  3.15  ---  --- 
1967 3.07  3.13  ---  --- 
1968 3.08  3.10  ---  --- 
1969 3.09  3.14  ---  --- 
       
1970 3.08  3.12  46.63 240.2 
1971 3.02  3.19  43.32 215.1 
1972 2.81  2.85  35.55 179.5 
1973 2.45  2.45  48.19 233.8 
1974 2.41  2.48 102.75 273.1 
       
1975 2.40  2.40  94.77 225.8 
1976 2.54  2.49 107.72 230.5 
1977 2.46  2.47 117.10 251.1 
1978 2.32  2.31 108.99 235.0 
1979 2.19  2.17 123.87 242.0 
       
1980 2.18  2.18 143.06 220.5 
1981 2.30  2.31 120.91 187.2 
1982 2.34  2.36  96.38 143.5 
1983 2.32  2.33  83.10 156.4 
1984 2.34  2.38  80.66 180.5 
       
1985 2.48  2.43  67.95 147.4 
1986 2.58  2.60  64.40 118.3 
1987 2.52  2.62  80.96 133.2 
1988 2.62  2.68  91.70 173.1 
1989 2.71  2.69  93.89 130.9 
       
1990 2.70  2.71  100 100.0 
1991 2.75  2.77  99.6 105.0 
1992 2.47  2.55  90.4 104.5 
1993 2.57  2.60  88.5 99.2 
1994 2.62  2.65  89.9 121.7 
       
1995 2.51  2.53  87.3 147.2 
1996 2.52  2.53  82.2 119.5 
1997 3.89  4.03  85.8 118.2 
1998 3.80  3.80  108.7 165.0   8
1999 3.80  3.80  104.8 115.1 
       
2000 3.80  3.80  104.7 82.7 
2001 3.80  3.80  101.1 69.6 
2002 3.80  3.80  98.7 94.7 
2003 3.80  3.80  102.1 110.1 
2004 3.80  3.80  105.9 115.0 
        
2005 3.78  3.78  104.6                            113.5 
 
Note 
1.   RER-TP      Real exchange rate for tradable 
 
= [NER*WPI]/DPI 
Where, NER and WPI are respectively trade-weighted nominal exchange rate 
(domestic-currency price of foreign currency) and trade-weighted wholesale 
price indices for the ten major trading partner countries, and DPI is the Malaysian 
GDP deflator. Trade weight used in compiling NER and WPI relate to the year 
2000. By construct, an increase in RER reflects real depreciation.  
2.   RER-TAE Real exchange rate for traditional agricultural exports (rubber,  palm  
oil and cocoa) 
 
= [NER*EP]/DPI 
Where, EP is export price index for rubber, palmoil and cocoa estimates as 
weighted-average of FOD price of each product (export value shares are used as 
variable weights) and the other variables are as defined in Note 1. 
  
 ---  Data not available. 
 
Source:  
Official rate: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (IFS) database.  
Black-market rate: International Currency Yearbook (various issues) 
RER: estimated using data extracted from IFS database and Bank Negara Malaysia (various 
issues) for export data for traditional agricultural exports. 
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Appendix Table A7: Nominal rates of assistance to covered agricultural products, 
Malaysia, 1960 to 2004   
(percent) 
   Cocoa  Palmoil  Rice  Rubber  All covered  
1960  0 -11  29 -14 -11 
1961  0 -11  21 -13  -8 
1962  0 -9 11 -9 -6 
1963 0  -10  14  -9  -6 
1964  0 -16  21 -15 -11 
1965  0 -10  25 -10  -5 
1966  0 -12  11 -11  -8 
1967 -1  -11  -10 -9  -10 
1968 -3 -9  -19 -7  -10 
1969  -2 -11 -16 -11 -12 
1970 -1  -10  3 -9 -7 
1971  -1 -17  20 -16 -10 
1972 -1  -12 19 -9 -4 
1973  -7 -11  -3 -11 -10 
1974  -4 -26 -23 -19 -22 
1975  1 -22 -17 -15 -18 
1976  -1 -12  74 -18  -8 
1977  -1 -22  83 -24 -16 
1978  -6 -11  27 -26 -17 
1979 -2 -9 30  -29  -18 
1980 -2 -7 29  -29  -17 
1981 -1 -7 33  -22  -10 
1982 -1 -5 81  -13  0 
1983 -1 -3  160  -15  1 
1984 -3 -7  167  -13 -2 
1985 4 1  192  -4 8 
1986 -1 -3  171 -8  4 
1987 -7 -8  253  -13 -3 
1988 -4 -5  112  -12 -2 
1989 1 0  63  -6 2 
1990 -1 -2  123 -7  5 
1991 -1 -2  100 -7  4 
1992 -6 -6  147  -12  1 
1993 -2 -3  165 -8  5 
1994 -2 -3  101 -7  2 
1995 -1 -3  117 -5  2 
1996 -1 -2 86 -5  3 
1997 -8 -9  6  -13 -8 
1998  0 -1 26 -5  1 
1999  0 -1 52 -6  2 
2000  0 -1 54 -5  3 
2001  0 -2 89 -6  3 
2002  0 -1 82 -5  2 
2003  0 -1 65 -4  1 
2004  0 -1 65 -3  2 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet.   10
Appendix TableA8: Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agricultural products, 
to exportable
b and import-competing
 b agricultural industries, and relative
c to non-
agricultural industries, Malaysia, 1960 to 2004   (percent) 












tradables NRA  RRA 
1960 0  -11  0- 1 0 8  - 1 7
1961 0  -8  0- 7 8  - 1 4
1962 0  -6  0- 5 8  - 1 2
1963 0  -6  0- 5 7  - 1 1
1964 0  -11  0- 9 7  - 1 5
1965 0  -5  0- 4 6  - 1 0
1966 0  -8  0- 7 6  - 1 2
1967 0  -10  0- 8 8  - 1 5
1968 0  -10  0- 9 8  - 1 6
1969 0  -12  0- 1 0 8  - 1 7
1970 0  -7  0- 6 7  - 1 2
1971 0  -10  0- 9 7  - 1 5
1972 0  -4  0- 3 9  - 1 2
1973 0  -10  0- 8 8  - 1 6
1974 0  -22  0- 1 9 4  - 2 3
1975 0  -18  0- 1 5 6  - 2 1
1976 0  -8  0- 7 6  - 1 2
1977 0  -16  0- 1 3 7  - 2 0
1978 0  -17  0- 1 5 6  - 2 1
1979 0  -18  0- 1 5 7  - 2 1
1980 0  -17  0- 1 4 6  - 2 0
1981 0  -10  0- 8 5  - 1 3
1982 0  0  00 5  - 5
1983 0  1  01 5  - 4
1984 0  -2  0- 2 5  - 6
1985 0  8  06 4  2
1986 0  4  03 4  - 1
1987 0  -3  0- 2 5  - 7
1988 0  -2  0- 2 4  - 5
1989 0  2  02 3  - 1
1990 0  5  04 3  1
1991 0  4  03 3  0
1992 0  1  01 3  - 2
1993 0  5  03 3  1
1994 0  2  01 3  - 1
1995 0  2  01 2  - 1
1996 0  3  02 3  - 1
1997 0  -8  0- 5 2  - 8
1998 0  1  00 1  - 1
1999 0  2  01 2  0
2000 0  3  02 1  1
2001 0  3  02 1  1
2002 0  2  01 1  0
2003 0  1  01 1  0













































a NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 
b NRAs including products specific input subsidies.  





t are the percentage NRAs for the 
tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.  
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet.   11
Appendix Table A9: Value shares of primary production of covered
a and non-covered 
products, Malaysia, 1960 to 2004  (percent) 
   Cocoa  Palmoil Rice Rubber Non-covered  
1960 na  3  7 91 14 
1961 na  3 12 84 14 
1962 na  4 15 81 14 
1963 na  4 16 80 14 
1964 na  5 13 82 14 
1965 na  6 14 79 14 
1966 na  7 15 78 14 
1967  0  8 20 72 14 
1968  0  7 24 69 14 
1969  0  6 18 75 14 
1970  0 13 19 68 14 
1971  0 19 16 65 14 
1972  0 20 20 60 14 
1973  0 13 20 66 14 
1974  0 26 20 53 14 
1975  1 34 21 44 15 
1976  1 25 10 65 15 
1977  0 36  7 57 15 
1978  1 32  7 61 15 
1979  1 31  9 60 15 
1980  1 30  8 61 17 
1981  1 36 12 51 19 
1982  1 46 10 42 21 
1983  2 39  6 53 23 
1984  2 61  4 33 25 
1985  3 57  5 36 25 
1986  4 41  5 49 25 
1987  4 38  3 55 25 
1988  3 50  5 42 27 
1989  3 57  7 33 29 
1990  3 54  7 36 31 
1991  3 59  8 31 33 
1992  2 64  6 28 35 
1993  2 65  5 28 37 
1994  1 63  5 30 39 
1995  1 72  4 23 41 
1996  1 72  6 21 41 
1997  1 75  9 16 41 
1998 1  85 5 9  42 
1999  1 84  5 10 42 
2000  0 82  8 10 43 
2001  0 77  6 17 43 
2002  0 78  5 16 43 
2003  0 79  4 17 43 
2004 0  96 4  na  43 
a At farmgate undistorted prices 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet.  